Abstract. Probabilistic model checking for stochastic games enables formal verification of systems where competing or collaborating entities operate in a stochastic environment. While good progress has been made in the area, existing approaches focus on zero-sum goals and cannot reason about distinct entities collaborating whilst working to different objectives. In this paper, we propose probabilistic model checking techniques for concurrent stochastic games based on Nash equilibria. We extend the temporal logic rPATL (probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic with rewards) for reasoning about players with distinct quantitative goals which relate to either the probability of an event occurring or a reward measure. We present algorithms to synthesise strategies that are social welfare optimal Nash equilibria, i.e., where there is no incentive for any players to unilaterally change their strategy, whilst the combined probabilities or rewards are maximised. We implement our techniques in an extension of the PRISM-games tool and demonstrate their application to several case studies, including network protocols and robot navigation.
Introduction
Probabilistic model checking is a technique for formally verifying systems that exhibit uncertainty or feature randomisation. Quantitative system requirements, in terms of e.g. safety, reliability or performance, are formally specified in temporal logic. These are then automatically checked against a probabilistic model, such as a Markov chain, capturing the possible behaviour of the system being verified. Closely related is strategy synthesis, which uses probabilistic models with nondeterminism, such as Markov decision processes (MDPs), to automatically generate policies or controllers that guarantee that pre-specified system requirements are satisfied. Thanks to mature tool support [22, 17] , the methods have been successfully applied to many domains, from UAVs to task scheduling.
Stochastic games are a modelling formalism that incorporates probability, nondeterminism and multiple players who can compete or collaborate to achieve their goals. A variety of verification algorithms for these models have been devised, e.g., [10, 38, 2, 3, 11] . More recently, probabilistic model checking and strategy synthesis techniques for stochastic games have been proposed [14, 5, 23] and implemented in the PRISM-games tool [25] . This has allowed modelling and verification of stochastic games to be used for a variety of non-trivial applications in which competitive or collaborative behaviour between entities is a crucial ingredient, including computer security and energy management.
Initial work in this direction focused on turn-based stochastic games (TSGs), where each state is controlled by a single player [14] , and proposed the logic rPATL, an extension of the well known logic ATL [4] . This can specify that a coalition of players is able to achieve a quantitative objective regarding the probability of an events occurrence or the expectation of a reward measure, regardless of the strategies of the other players. Recently [23] , this was extended to concurrent stochastic games (CSGs), in which players make decisions simultaneously. This allows more realistic modelling of interactive agents operating and reasoning concurrently. In another direction, multi-objective model checking of TSGs [15, 5] reasoned about coalitions aiming to satisfy a Boolean combination of objectives, regardless of the remaining players' behaviour.
A limitation of these approaches to probabilistic model checking of games is that they focus on zero-sum properties, in which a coalition aims to satisfy some requirement or to optimise some objective, while the remaining players have the directly opposing goal. In this paper, we consider CSGs in which two coalitions of players have distinct quantitative objectives. For this, we use the notion of Nash equilibria, i.e., scenarios in which it is not beneficial for any player to unilaterally change their strategy. Furthermore, amongst these, we consider social welfare equilibria, which maximise the sum of the objectives of the players.
We propose an extension to the logic rPATL which allows reasoning about social welfare Nash equilibria (SWNE) between two coalitions of players, with respect to probabilistic or reward objectives, expressed using a variety of temporal operators. We then give a model checking algorithm for the logic against CSGs which employs a combination of backwards induction (for time-bounded operators) and value iteration (for unbounded operators). A key ingredient of the computation is finding SWNE for bimatrix games, which we perform using labelled polytopes [26] and a reduction to SMT. We implement our techniques as an extension of the PRISM-games [25] model checker and develop a selection of case studies, including robot navigation, communication protocols and power control, to evaluate its performance and applicability. We show that we are able to synthesise strategies that outperform those derived using existing techniques.
Related Work. Game-theoretic models are used in many contexts within verification and we have summarised many of those that use stochastic games above. The existence and complexity of finding (general) Nash equilibria for stochastic games have also been studied [13, 38] , but without practical algorithms or implementations. For non-stochastic games, model checking tools such as PRA-LINE [7] , EAGLE [37] and EVE [20] support Nash equilibria, as does MCMAS-SLK [8] via strategy logic. General purpose tools such as Gambit [27] can compute a variety of equilibria but, again, not for stochastic games. Finally we mention [18] , which formalises a notion of strong Nash equilibria for a restricted class of CSGs called probabilistic BAR (Byzantine, Altruistic and Rational) sys-tems. The work focuses on verifying the existence of such equilibria for bounded and discounted cumulative reward properties. An approximation algorithm is introduced, implemented and applied to case studies.
Preliminaries
We first provide some background material on game theory and stochastic games. We let Dist(X) denote the set of probability distributions over set X.
Definition 1 (Normal form game).
A (finite, n-person) normal form game (NFG) is a tuple N = (N, A, u) where: N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players; A = A 1 × · · · ×A n and A i is a finite set of actions available to player i ∈ N ; u=(u 1 , . . . , u n ) and u i : A → R is a utility function for player i ∈ N .
For an NFG N, the players choose actions at the same time, where the choice for player i ∈ N is over the action set A i . When each player i choose a i , the utility received by player j equals u j (a 1 , . . . , a n ). A (mixed) strategy σ i for player i is a distribution over its action set. A strategy profile σ=(σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) is a tuple of strategies for each player and under σ the expected utility of player i equals:
For profile σ=(σ 1 , . . . , σ n ), player i strategy σ ′ i , we define the sequence σ −i = (σ 1 , . . . , σ i−1 , σ i+1 , . . . , σ n ) and profile σ −i [σ player get nothing while the remaining players get a small payoff. A scenario with 3 players, where the final two form a coalition, yields a bimatrix game:
where x i and y i represent that i−1 players in coalition choose to cooperate. There are three Nash equilibria for this game:
-player 1 and the coalition select x 1 and y 1 with utility values (2, 4); -player 1 selects x 1 and x 2 with probabilities 5/9 and 4/9 and the coalition selects y 1 and y 2 with probabilities 2/3 and 1/3 with utility values (2, 4); -player 1 and the coalition selects x 2 and y 3 with utility values (6, 9) .
For instance, in the first case, neither player 1 nor the coalition thinks the other will cooperate, the best they can do is act alone. The third is the only SWNE.
Concurrent stochastic games.
In this paper, we use concurrent stochastic games (CSGs), in which players repeatedly make simultaneous (probabilistic) choices that update the game state. A CSG G starts in the initial states and, when in state s, each player i ∈ N selects an action from its available actions A i (s) given by ∆(s) ∩ A i if this set is non-empty and {⊥} otherwise. Supposing player i selects action a i , the state of the game is updated according to the distribution δ(s, (a 1 , . . . , a n )). We augment CSGs with reward structures of the form r = (r A , r S ) where r A : S×A → R 0 is an action reward function and r S : S → R 0 is a state reward function. A path of G represents a resolution of both the players' and probabilistic choices and is given by a sequence π = s 0
For a path π, the (i+1)th state is denoted π(i), the (i+1)th action π[i], and if π is finite, the final state by last (π). The length of path π is given by the number of transitions and denoted |π|. The sets of finite and infinite paths (starting in state s) are given by FPaths G and IPaths G (FPaths G,s and IPaths G,s ).
CSG strategies and equilibria. A strategy resolves the choices of a player i in a CSG G. More precisely, it is a function σ i : FPaths G → Dist(A i ) such that if σ i (π)(a i )>0, then a i ∈ A i (last (π)). We denote by Σ player i. A strategy is deterministic if it selects actions with probability 1 and memoryless if it makes the same choice for paths that end in the same state.
As for NFGs, a strategy profile for G is a tuple σ=(σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) of strategies for all players and, for a player i strategy σ ′ i , we define the sequence σ −i and profile [21] and, for random variable X : IPaths G → R 0 , the expected value E (X i ) − ε for all players i.
For simplicity, we refer to ε-Nash equilibria as Nash equilibria. The notion of SWNE for NFGs (see Definition 3) applies straightforwardly to CSGs.
Example 2. In [7] a deterministic concurrent game is used to model medium access control. Two users with limited energy share a wireless channel and choose between transmitting or waiting and, if both transmit, the transmissions fail due to interference. We extend this to a CSG by assuming if both transmit, there is a probability (q 2 ) the transmissions succeed. Figure 1 presents a CSG where each user has energy for one transmission (the first value of tuples labelling states represents if a user has energy and the second if it has successfully transmitted).
If the objectives are to maximise the probability of a successful transmission, there are two SWNEs when one user waits for the other to transmit and then transmits. This means both successfully transmit. If the objectives are to maximise the probability of being one of the first to transmit their packet, then there is only one SWNE corresponding to both immediately try to transmit.
Extending rPATL with Nash Formulae
We now extend the logic rPATL, previously proposed for zero-sum properties of both TSGs and CSGs [14, 23] , to allow the analysis of equilibria-based properties.
Definition 6 (Extended rPATL syntax). The syntax of our extended version of rPATL is given by the grammar:
where a ∈ AP is an atomic proposition, C ⊆ N is a coalition of players, ∼ ∈ {< , , , >}, q ∈ [0, 1], x ∈ R, r is a reward structure and k ∈ N.
The logic rPATL is a branching-time temporal logic that combines the probabilistic operator P of PCTL [19] , PRISM's reward operator R [22] , and the coalition operator C of ATL [4] . The formula C P q [ ψ ], e.g., states that the coalition C has strategies which when followed, regardless of the strategies of N \C, guarantee that the probability of satisfying path formula ψ is at least q. Such properties are inherently zero-sum in nature as one coalition tries to maximise an objective (here the probability of ψ) and the other to minimise it. We extend rPATL with the ability to reason about equilibria using the Nash operator N. In addition to the usual state (φ), path (ψ) and reward (ρ) formulae, we distinguish non-zero sum formulae (θ), which comprise a pair of probability or reward objectives. The formula C N ∼x (θ) is satisfied if there exist strategies for all players that form a social welfare Nash equilibrium between coalitions C and N \C, and under which the sum of the two objectives in θ is ∼x. As is common for probabilistic temporal logics, we also allow numerical queries of the form C N =? (θ) which return the (unique) sum of SWNE values.
For probabilistic objectives (θ = P[ ψ 1 , ψ 2 ]), we are interested in the probability of satisfying ψ 1 and ψ 2 . Each ψ i can be a "next" (X), "bounded until" (U k ) or "until" (U) operator, with the usual equivalences such as F φ ≡ true U φ ("eventually"). For reward objectives (θ = R r1,r2 [ ρ 1 , ρ 2 ]), each ρ i refers to the expected reward with respect to reward structure r i : the instantaneous reward after k steps (I =k ); the reward accumulated over k steps (C k ); or the reward accumulated until a state satisfying φ is reached (F φ).
Example 3. Recall the medium access control CSG of Example 2. The formula
) means both players can successfully send their packet with probability 1, while
asks what is the sum of SWNE values when the objectives are to maximise the probability of being one of the first to successfully transmit their packet.
Before we give the semantics, we define coalition games which, given a CSG and coalition (set of players), reduces the CSG to a two-player CSG. Without loss of generality we assume the coalition of players is of the form C = {1, . . . , n ′ }.
) is a two-player game where:
. . , a n )). Furthermore, for a reward structure r of G, by abuse of notation we use r for the corresponding reward structure of G C which is constructed similarly. 
Model Checking CSGs against Nash Formulae
Since rPATL is a branching-time logic, the basic model checking algorithm works by recursively computing the set Sat(φ) of states satisfying formula φ over the structure of φ. So, to extend the existing rPATL model checking algorithm for CSGs [23] to the logic from Section 3, we need only consider Nash formulae C N ∼x (θ). This requires computation of the (unique) SWNE values for the objective pair θ and then a comparison of their sum to the threshold x.
We first explain how we compute SWNE values in bimatrix games, then SWNE values for time-bounded objectives and lastly how to approximate and finally SWNE values of unbounded objectives. We also discuss how to also synthesise SWNE profiles. We use the notation N G C ,s (θ) for SWNE values of the objectives (X θ1 , X θ2 ) in state s of the game G C . We also use the notation P max
for the maximum probability of satisfying ψ and maximum expected reward for the random variable rew (r, ρ), respectively, in state s when all players collaborate. These can be computed through standard MDP model checking [6, 1] .
Computing SWNE Values of Bimatrix Games. Finding Nash equilibria in bimatrix games is in the class of linear complementarity problems (LCPs). More precisely, a profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game Z 1 , Z 2 ∈ R l×m if and only if there exists u, v ∈ R such that for the column vectors x ∈ R l , y ∈ R m , where x i =σ 1 (a i ) and y j =σ 2 (b j ) for 1 i l and 1 j m:
where 0 and 1 are vectors or matrices with all components 0 or 1, respectively. The Lemke-Howson algorithm [26] can be applied for finding Nash equilibria and is based on the method of labelled polytopes [29] . Other well-known methods include those based on support enumeration [31] and regret minimisation [33] .
SWNE via Labelled Polytopes. Given a bimatrix game Z 1 , Z 2 ∈ R l×m , we denote the sets of deterministic strategies of players 1 and 2 by I={1, . . . , l} and M ={1, . . . , m} and define J={l+1, . . . , l+m} by mapping j ∈ M to l+j ∈ J. A label is then defined as element of I ∪ J. The sets of strategies for players 1 and 2 can be represented by:
The strategy set Y is then divided into regions Y (i) (polytopes) for i ∈ I such that the deterministic strategy i of player 1 is a best response:
where Z 1 (i, :) is the ith row vector of Z 1 . Furthermore, the regions Y (j), for j ∈ J, contain strategies which choose action j with probability zero:
A vector y is then said to have label k if y ∈ Y (k), for k ∈ I ∪ J. The strategy set X is divided analogously into regions X(j) where each deterministic strategy j of player 2 is a best response and regions X(i) for which action i has probability 0. Furthermore, a vector x is said to have label k if x ∈ X(k), for k ∈ I ∪ J. A pair of vectors (x, y) ∈ X × Y is completely labelled if the union of the labels of x and y equals I ∪ J. The Nash equilibria of the game equal the vector pairs that are completely labelled [26, 35] .
Once all completely labelled vector pairs have been computed, one can calculate the corresponding set of values through matrix-vector multiplication. The pairs that maximise the sum of values correspond to the SWNE strategies. In case of multiple SWNE, we choose the values that are maximal for the first player, unless both players can get equal payoff in which case we choose these.
Computing Values of Nash Formulae. For a Nash formula C N ∼x (θ) where the objectives (X θ1 , X θ2 ) both correspond to time-bounded properties, we can use backwards induction [34, 28] to compute SWNE values. Below, we give the cases for bounded probabilistic reachability and bounded cumulative reward objectives and the other cases follow similarly. If (X θ1 , X θ2 ) both correspond to unbounded properties, we use value iteration [12] . Since we compute values for SWNE and there is not necessarily a unique pair of values, the convergence criterion is applied to the sum of the two values computed, which is unique. Below, we explain value iteration for probabilistic and expected reachability objectives. For cases where there is a combination of time-bounded and unbounded objectives, we can convert it to the unbounded case on an extended model, in a standard manner for probabilistic model checking (for details on this reduction in the case of MDPs see, e.g. [32] ).
Bounded Probabilistic
where η φi (s) equals 1 if s ∈ Sat (φ i ) and else equals 0, and otherwise:
where val (Z 1 , Z 2 ) are SWNE values of the bimatrix game (Z 1 , Z 2 ) ∈ R l×m with:
, then we compute SWNE values for the objectives corresponding to R r1,r2 [ C n1 , C n2 ] for n 1 k 1 and n 2 k 2 recursively as follows. For state s if min{n 1 , n 2 }=0, then:
are SWNE values of the bimatrix game (Z 1 , Z 2 ) ∈ R l×m where:
, the values can be computed through value iteration as the limit lim k→∞ N G C ,s (P[ F φ 1 , F φ 2 ]) k where:
, the values can be computed through value iteration as the limit lim
For simplicity, we restrict our attention to reachability reward properties that have targets which all profiles reach with probability 1.
Strategy Synthesis. In addition to property verification, it is usually beneficial to perform strategy synthesis, that is, to construct a witness of the satisfaction of a property. In the case of a Nash formula C N ∼q [θ], we can return a SWNE for the objectives (X θ1 , X θ2 ). This is achieved using the approach above, both keeping track of the SWNE for the bimatrix game solved in each state and, when computing optimal values for MDPs, also performing strategy synthesis [24] (a strategy of the MDP is equivalent to a strategy profile of the game). We can then combine these generated profiles to yield a SWNE. The synthesised strategies require randomisation and memory. Memory is needed since choices change after a path formulae becomes true or a target is reached and is required for bounded properties. For unbounded properties, the use of value iteration means only approximate strategies are synthesised, while for such properties only ε-Nash equilibria may exist for any ε>0 . However, for the case studies considered in Section 6, we find that all synthesised strategies are SWNE with ε=0.
Complexity and Correctness. For the proof of correctness of the model checking algorithm for Nash formulae, see Appendix A. Considering complexity, it is linear in the size of the formula, while finding Nash equilibria for reachability objectives is EXPTIME [9] . The implementation uses value iteration, which solves an LCP problem of size |A| for each state every iteration, with the number of iterations depending on the convergence criterion. Section 6 reports on efficiency in practice.
Implementation and Tool Support
We have extended PRISM-games [25] with support for modelling and verification of CSGs against equilibria-based properties, building upon the CSG extension of [23] . The tool and files for the case studies of Section 6 are available from [39] .
Modelling. CSGs are specified using an extension of the PRISM modelling language, in which behaviour is defined using probabilistic guarded commands of the form [a] g → u, where a is an action label, g is a guard (a predicate over states) and u is a probabilistic state update. If it is enabled (i.e., g is true), an a-labelled transition can probabilistically update the model's state.
This language is adapted to CSGs in [23] by assigning actions to players and, in any state, letting each player choose between enabled commands labelled with one of its actions (if no such command is enabled, the player idles). One requirement of [23] was that the updates of all player were independent of each other. In order to create more meaningful models for this work, we extend the language to remove this requirement, by allowing commands to be labelled with lists of actions [a 1 , . . . , a n ] and thus represent behaviour which depends on which actions other players choose. Reward definitions are extended similarly so that individual player's rewards can depend on the choices taken by multiple players.
Implementation. We have implemented model construction of CSGs for the adapted modelling language described above, and the model checking and strategy synthesis algorithms of Section 4, extending the PRISM-games implementation of rPATL verification from [23] . We build on PRISM's Java-based "explicit" model checking engine which uses sparse matrices, and add an SMT-based implementation for solving bimatrix games using Z3 [16] . The set of all Nash equilibria for a bimatrix game is computed by progressively querying the SMT solver for new profiles until the model becomes unsatisfiable. Structuring the problem using labelled polytopes, which can be expressed through conjunctions, disjunctions and linear inequalities, avoids the use of non-linear arithmetic. As an optimisation, we also search for and filter out dominated strategies as a precomputation step to reduce the number of calls to the solver.
Case Studies and Experimental Results
We now present case studies and results to demonstrate the applicability of our approach and implementation, as well as the benefits of using equilibria. Table 1 : Statistics for a representative set of CSG verification instances.
Efficiency and Scalability. Before describing the case studies, we first discuss the performance of the implementation. In Table 1 , we show experiments on a representative set of models and equilibrium properties, run on a 2.10 GHz Intel Xeon using 16GB RAM. The table includes model statistics (players, states and transitions) and the time to construct the CSG and verify it; the latter is split between CSG verification (including solving the bimatrix games) and the instances of MDP verification. We see that our tool can analyse models with over 2 million states and 20 million transitions; all are solved in under 2 hours and most are considerably quicker. The majority of the time is spent solving bimatrix games. The larger instances of the Aloha models are verified relatively quickly since the players have only one choice in a large number of states.
Investigating the Benefits of Equilibria Properties. In each of the case studies that follow, we compare the results for equilibria properties with those obtained for the corresponding zero-sum properties [23] . E.g., for a formula
, we also compute the value and an optimal strategy σ C for the coalition C of the formula C P max=? [ F φ 1 ], and then find the value of an optimal strategy for the dual coalition N \C for both P min=? [ F φ 2 ] or P max=? [ F φ 2 ] in the MDP induced by CSG when the coalition C follows σ C . As will be seen, all the presented results demonstrate that by using Nash equilibrium properties at least one of the players gains and in almost all cases neither player loses (in the one case study where this is not the case the gains are far greater than the losses). The individual SWNE values for players need not be unique and for all case studies (except Aloha in which the players goals are not symmetric), the values of the players can be swapped to give alternative SWNE values.
Robot Coordination. Our first case study models a scenario in which two robots move concurrently over a grid of size l×l. The robots start in diagonally opposite corners and try to reach the corner from which the other starts. A robot can move either diagonally, horizontally or vertically towards its goal and when 
it moves there is a probability (q) that it instead moves in an adjacent direction. E.g., if a robot moves north east, then with probability q/2 it will move north or east. If the robots enter the same cell, they crash and are unable to move again. We consider the Nash equilibrium where the two robots maximise the probability of reaching their individual goals both eventually and within a given number of steps (k). If there is no bound and l 4, the SWNE strategies allow each robot to reach its goal with probability 1 (as time is not an issue, they can collaborate to avoid crashing and reach their goals). For the bounded case, in Figure 2 we have plotted both the sum of the probabilities for a grid of size 10 (left) and the probabilities of the individual players for different grid sizes (right) as k varies. When there is only one route to each goal within the bound (along the diagonal), i.e. when k = l−1, the SWNE strategies of both robots take this route. In odd grids, there is a high chance of crashing, but also a chance one will deviate and the other reaches their goal. Initially as the bound k increases, for odd grids the SWNE values for the players are not equal (see Figure 2 right). Here, it is better overall for one to follow the diagonal and the other to take a longer route, as if the other switched to the diagonal route, the chance of crashing increases, decreasing the chance of reaching their goals.
Aloha. This case study concerns three users trying to send packets using the slotted ALOHA protocol. In a time slot, if a single user tries to send a packet, there is a probability (q) that the packet is sent; if more than one user tries, then the probability of success decreases by a factor based on the number sending. If sending a packet fails, the number of slots a user waits before resending is set according to an exponential backoff scheme. More precisely, each user maintains a backoff counter which it increases each time there is a failure (up to bcmax ) and, if the counter equals k, randomly chooses the slots to wait from {0, 1, . . . , 2 k −1}. We verify p 1 N =? (P[ F (sent 1 ∧ t t max ), F (sent 2 ∧ sent 3 ∧ t t max ) ]) which corresponds to the players trying to maximise the probability of sending their packets before deadline t max , with p 2 and p 3 forming a coalition. Figure 3 presents total values as t max varies (left) and individual values as q varies (right). Through synthesis, we find the collaboration is dependent on t max and q. Given more time there is more chance for the users to collaborate and send in different slots. If q is small, it is likely that players have to repeatedly try and send their packets, hence waiting for others to send in the limited slots is not advanta- geous. On the other hand, if q large, it is unlikely users need to repeatedly sent, so can collaborate and send in different slots. We also see that the probabilities for a coalition of p 2 and p 3 are lower than for p 1 , which is to be expected as the coalition has to send two messages. However, even for a model of two players, the values for the two players are different. Although it is advantageous to collaborate and only one player tries first, if transmission fails, then both players try to send at the same time as this is the best option for their individual goals.
Medium Access Control. Our third case study extends the CSG model from Example 2 by assuming the probability of a successful transmission when a single user tries to transmit equals q 1 and the energy of each user is bounded by e max .
We consider two Nash equilibrium properties for this model, both bounded by the number of time slots (k). The goal for each user in the first property is to maximise their expected number of successful transmissions and the second to maximise the probability of successfully transmitting a certain number (s max ) of messages. Figure 4 presents results for these properties as the bound k varies. For both properties, the SWNE strategies yield equal values for the players. Synthesising strategies we see that for small values of k there is not sufficient time to collaborate (both users always try and transmit), however as k increases there is time for the users to collaborate and try and transmit in different slots, and hence improve their values. Since the users have limited energy, Figure 4 shows that eventually adding steps does not increase the reward or probability.
Power Control. Our final case study is based on the model of power control in cellular networks from [7] . In the model, phones emit signals over a cellular 
network and the signals can be strengthened by increasing the power level up to a bound (pow max ). A stronger signal can result in a better transmission, but uses more energy and also lowers the transmission quality of other signals due to interference. We extend this model by associating a failure probability (q fail ) when a power level is increased and assume that each phone has a limited battery capacity (e max ). Based on the reward structure in [7] , we associate a reward with each phone representing transmission quality dependent both on its power level and that of other phones due to interference. We consider the property
where two players each try to maximise their reward before their battery is empty. Figure 5 presents the sum of the SWNE values (left) and the values of the individual players (right) as the maximum power level varies. As can be seen, the generated SWNE values of players are different. This is because if one player increases their power level this increases the overall reward (their reward increases, while the other player's decreases by a lesser amount due to interference), while if both players increase their power level the overall reward decreases (both rewards decrease due to interference). Considering the synthesised SWNE when pow max =2, q fail =0.1 and e max =4, in the first time-slot player 2 tries to increment their power level, in the second the players do nothing and in the third, if initially player 2 was successful, then player 1 tries to increment its power level, otherwise both players try to increment their power levels. For this profile, player 1 has a greater expected reward as, although player 2 gains in the first three time slots when having a higher power level, in the final slot player 1 has a high chance of transmitting at a high power level without interference (as player 2's battery is empty).
Conclusions
We have presented a logic, algorithms and tool for model checking and strategy synthesis of concurrent stochastic games using Nash equilibrium-based properties. In comparison to existing methods, which support only zero-sum properties, we demonstrate, on a range of case studies, that our approach produces strategies that are collectively more beneficial for all players in the game. Future work will investigate other techniques for Nash equlibria synthesis, non-coalitional multiplayer games and mechanism design.
We next show that the values generated by our model checking procedure are between the SWNE approximate values and SWNE actual values for objectives. 
where (u n , v n ) = N G C ,s (θ) n .
Proof. Consider any state s, formula θ, n ∈ N and SWNE profiles (σ n ) and (X θ1 , X θ2 ) in G C respectively. Furthermore, for any n ∈ N, let N G C ,s (θ) n = (u n , v n ). We consider the case when θ = P[ F φ 1 , F φ 2 ] and the case when θ = R r1,r2 [ F φ 1 , F φ 2 ] follows similarly. If s |= φ 1 ∨ φ 2 , then the result follows from Lemma 1, Lemma 3 and the definition of N G C ,s (θ) 0 .
Therefore it remains to consider the case when s |= ¬(φ 1 ∨ φ 2 ). First, using induction we prove:
holds for all n ∈ N. The case when n = 0 follows from Definition 9 and the definition of N G C ,s (θ) 0 . Now suppose the inequality holds for some n ∈ N. From the correctness of backwards induction, we have that the values of a SWNE for the bimatrix game (Z 1 , Z 2 ) ∈ R l×m with: Second, we prove, again using induction, the inequality:
The correctness of the model checking procedure follows directly from the following theorem. 2 ) for the objectives (X θ1 , X θ2 ) in G C , if N G C ,s (θ) n = (u n , v n ) for n ∈ N, then u n +v n n∈N is an increasing sequence converging to E
Proof. The fact the sequence is increases can be proved straight forwardly by induction. Convergence follows by combining Lemma 3 and Proposition 1. ⊓ ⊔
